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Differentiating Contemporary Racial Prejudice from Old-Fashioned Racial Prejudice*

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Abstract

The present study addresses the distinction between contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice using survey data from a national sample ($n=600$) of self-identified whites living in the United States and interviewed by telephone in 2001. First, we examine associations among indicators of contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice. Consistent with the literature, contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators represent two distinct but correlated common factors. Second, we examine whether belief in genetic race differences uniformly predicts both types of prejudice. As might be expected, belief in genetic race differences predicts old-fashioned prejudice but contrary to recent theorizing, it also predicts contemporary prejudice.

Keywords

belief in genetic race differences; contemporary racial prejudice; genetic explanations; old-fashioned racial prejudice

Notwithstanding progress toward racial parity, harmony, and integration achieved since institutionalization of the civil rights movement in the United States, evidence suggests that promises of equal opportunity have yielded to racial retrenchment and covert ways of discriminating against black and other non-white minority racial groups (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bobo and Smith 1998; Bonilla-Silva 2003; Hochschild 1995; Sears 1998; Sears et al. 2000; Williams et al. 2000:504–6). Consistent with this evidence, Sears (1998:80–2) characterized the U.S. racial climate and whites' racial attitudes since World War II using three descriptors: progress, polarization, and continuing white antagonism. So there is simultaneous evidence of increasing and decreasing racial tolerance.

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Whites' racial prejudice is the barometer routinely used to gauge the racial climate. One problem with this strategy is that there is a complicated connection between support for egalitarian values and whites' racial prejudice (Bobo and Smith 1994, 1998; Hochschild 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears 1988; Sears et al. 1997; Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000), and an even more complicated connection between support for implementation of ameliorative policy (e.g., affirmative action, welfare, redistricting, etc.) and whites' racial prejudice (Bobo 1983; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Hughes 1997; Krysan 2000; Schuman et al. 1997; Sears 1998; Sears et al. 2000; Sears and Henry 2003; Wachtel 1999:249–252; Williams et al. 2000). Another problem with this strategy is that whites' racial prejudice is unstable. For instance, about twenty years after racial segregation was outlawed, a shift was noted in the intensity of whites' negative attitudes toward blacks, specifically an attitudinal softening.

Wachtel (1999:36, 114) characterized this shift as a movement from outright hatred and disgust toward indifference or lack of sympathy for blacks. Those monitoring whites' racial attitudes argued that an ideological change had taken place in society, impacting how whites expressed anti-black affect (Bobo 1983; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bobo and Smith 1998; Kinder and Sanders 1996:6; Krysan 2000; Schuman et al. 1997:191; Sears 1998). Specifically, whites were reluctant to endorse intolerant responses to survey questions assessing their negative feelings toward blacks and preference for social distance from blacks (i.e., old-fashioned racial prejudice). Also, there was nearly universal endorsement of egalitarian values without commensurate willingness to support ameliorative policies. The aforementioned ideological change and 'creed-deed disjoint' contributed to conceptualization of a new type of racial prejudice (i.e., contemporary racial prejudice). This new type of prejudice was consistent with whites' commitment to egalitarian values yet pragmatic opposition to racial parity. It supposedly relied on attributions about violation of American values meshed with anti-black affect rather than on beliefs about biological difference and inferiority. This is not to suggest that those expressing contemporary prejudice are less evil than those expressing old-fashioned prejudice, but rather that these actors are portrayed as unique constituents of the white population (e.g., George Wallace: old-fashioned prejudice vs. Newt Gingrich: contemporary prejudice).

The present study addresses the distinction between contemporary and old-fashioned racial prejudice. First, we empirically investigate whether indicators of contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice are predicted by two correlated common factors. Second, we empirically investigate whether belief in genetic race differences uniformly predicts both types of prejudice. Prior to presenting those analyses, we conceptually discern contemporary prejudice from old-fashioned prejudice and critique contemporary prejudice as setup for our hypotheses.

TYPES OF RACIAL PREJUDICE

Many researchers (Bobo and Smith 1998; Bonilla-Silva 2003; Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Henry and Sears 2002; Hochschild 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Krysan 2000; McConahay 1986; McConahay and Hough 1976; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Schuman et al. 1997; Sears 1998; Sears, Henry et al. 2000; Wood 1994) argue that whites' racial prejudice has shifted over time. For instance, rampant expression of old-fashioned prejudice (also labeled traditional, Jim Crow, blatant, and racialism) has ceded to rampant expression of contemporary prejudice (also labeled symbolic, racial resentment, color-blind, new, laissez-faire, aversive, ambivalent, and subtle). The shift's catalyst is claimed by some scholars to be ideological. It remains unclear, however, what the relationship is between ideology and prejudice because some scholars make no distinction

between the constructs whereas other scholars study manifestations of prejudice independent of ideology or vice versa.

What is certain is that authors in camps aligned with variants of contemporary prejudice have been critical of one another (see Schuman et al. 1997:292–6; Sears et al. 2000:16–20). They tend to disagree about (or generally emphasize more or less in their respective renditions) the role of whites' childhood socialization to racial animosity (symbolic), the role of sociopolitical change (racial resentment), whites' motivations (color-blind, aversive, ambivalent), whites' awareness of racial intolerance they harbor (aversive, laissez-faire, modern), and lastly, operationalization (subtle) or even possibility of operationalization (aversive). To be clear, we privilege the role of sociopolitical change, ignore the debate about motivations, and rely on the operationalization associated with symbolic prejudice because it has received the most psychometric attention (see Henry and Sears 2002; Sears and Henry 2003; Tarman and Sears 2005). Despite the disagreements, authors in various camps generally maintain that whites are more egalitarian in principle today than in the recent past, most whites repudiate old-fashioned prejudice and find its expression unacceptable, and negative affect toward blacks has melded to some degree with conservative values.

Accompanying the above-mentioned shift in whites' racial prejudice is semantic divergence in social survey items used to measure prejudice. On the one hand, typical old-fashioned prejudice items include expressions of negative affect (e.g., disgust or anger toward black people) and belief that social distance should be maintained (e.g., blacks should not marry whites; black and white children should attend separate schools) (see Allport 1954; Bloom 1971; Bogardus 1933; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Sears and Henry 2003:260, 265; Schuman et al. 1997:151–3; Williams et al. 2000). Such measures were included in past social surveys and whites endorsed intolerant responses with vigor and without hesitation.

On the other hand, typical contemporary prejudice items involve endorsement that discrimination is no longer a relevant issue, that blacks are demanding too much ('they've gone too far'), and that blacks are shown special or preferential treatment relative to whites and/or other minority groups (see Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Bobo and Smith 1998; Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Henry and Sears 2002; Hughes 1997; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Sears and Henry 2003:267, 272; Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000:77–9; Tarman and Sears 2005). Contemporary prejudice therefore fuses anti-black affect with notions about blacks' violation of American values such as moral traditionalism, the work ethic, self-reliance, impulse control, patriotism, and obedience to authority. These American values are racialized to the extent that it is blacks' relative (and oftentimes perceived rather than actual) violation of them that matters to whites (see Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000:102–3 and Sears and Henry 2003:264–9 discussion of "black individualism").

When describing contemporary (symbolic) prejudice, Sears (1998:83) states, "It is called symbolic because it is phrased in terms that are abstract and ideological, reflecting the white person's moral code and sense of how society should be organized rather than having any direct bearing on the person's private life, and because it is focused on blacks as a group rather than on any specific individual." Contemporary prejudice is covert to the extent that some whites endorsing it genuinely embrace egalitarian values (Sears 1988:66; Sears and Henry 2003; Wood 1994). Further, it implies some sort of threat to white culture or habit (Sears 1988; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Tarman and Sears 2005). Thus contemporary prejudice, for many researchers, answers an empirically and a historically motivated question: How can whites' subscription to

egalitarian values be so universal and old-fashioned prejudice be so demonized while whites' opposition to affirmative action, black political candidates, and blacks' demands for full citizenship have hardened? Albeit useful, the concept of contemporary prejudice is not without its problems and to these we turn in the next section.

CRITIQUES OF CONTEMPORARY PREJUDICE

Critiques of contemporary prejudice are: it has been measured in inconsistent ways leading to variation in its psychometric properties; rather than a single construct, it is a multidimensional construct representing a fusion of negative black affect with violation of American values; its measures are similar to policy outcomes it seeks to predict; it confounds political conservatism with racial prejudice; and finally, it is indistinguishable from old-fashioned prejudice (Coenders et al. 2001; Henry and Sears 2002; Hughes 1997; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Schuman et al. 1997; Sears et al. 2000:18; Sniderman and Tetlock 1986; Tarman and Sears 2005:732; Wood 1994). Again, the present study addresses the last critique.

Are They Distinguishable Constructs?

Whether contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice are distinguishable constructs is debatable. Some empirical studies have documented a large correlation between them (Weigel and Howes 1985; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Hughes 1997; Sears 1998). For example, Sears, Henry, and Kosterman (2000) found a significant positive association between contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice after controlling for egalitarianism, political party and ideology, and demographic controls. Sniderman and Tetlock (1986) reviewed studies showing significant zero-order correlations ranging from .49 to .65 between forms of contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice. Further, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) found that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice were significantly and directly related, $r=.67$.

Yet few studies have investigated whether contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators represent two distinct constructs employing a factor analytic approach. As exceptions, Meertens and Pettigrew (1997) used principal component analysis to examine the covariance structure of multiple indicators of subtle (contemporary) and blatant (old-fashioned) prejudice in aggregated national samples of dominant groups from four Western European countries. After varimax rotation, which produces an orthogonal solution, they found evidence of stable components representing contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice. Using two national samples of whites living in the United States, Hughes (1997:59) found that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators constituted separate dimensions in factor analysis with varimax rotation. Using confirmatory factor analysis with oblique rotation, Henry and Sears (2002:268) found that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators load on two correlated common factors. In principal axis factor analysis (also known as principal factor analysis) with oblique rotation, Sears and Henry (2003:263–4) found that symbolic prejudice indicators load “quite strongly and equally” on two common factors representing political conservatism and old-fashioned (traditional) prejudice. According to the study's authors, their results demonstrate that, in the presence of political conservatism, contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice overlap. Data they analyzed come from four national samples and four regional samples. Finally, using five national samples of whites living in the United States, Tarman and Sears (2005:754–5) found that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice represent two correlated common factors with the standardized covariance between the common factors ranging from .31 to .45.

What is the Contribution of Belief in Genetic Race Differences?

Sears (1998:83) and others (McConahay and Hough 1976; McConahay 1986; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993; Bobo and Smith 1994, 1998; Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Henry and Sears 2002) argue that contemporary prejudice is different from old-fashioned prejudice because dissimilar ideologies produce them and were prevalent when they emerged. These scholars assert that contemporary prejudice is a coherent belief system about blacks' place in society and the polity that is tilted toward majority support whereas virtually all whites renounce old-fashioned prejudice (Tarman and Sears 2005:737; Sears et al. 2000). Supposedly, the negative feelings and preference for social distance that comprise old-fashioned prejudice are grounded in beliefs about genetic race differences (i.e., whites believe themselves to be of different and superior stock). In contrast, contemporary prejudice is based on beliefs regarding value incongruence, cultural deficiencies, or more generally, effort and initiative (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Kinder and Sanders 1996:115; Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000; Sears and Henry 2003).

Consistent with this position, when limning contemporary prejudice, Williams and colleagues (2000:506) state, "Outgroup members are viewed as inferior not because of biology but because they lack the traditional values, motivation, or behavioral strategies necessary for success." Similarly Kinder and Sanders (1996:97) state, "The notion of genetic difference, of permanent disadvantage, is now less prominent than it once was... Racial prejudice no longer hangs on the contention that blacks are an inferior race, incapacitated from the outset by their biological inheritance." However, Kinder and Sanders caution that whites' belief in biological superiority should bear some modest correlation with contemporary prejudice if for no other reason than its relation to old-fashioned prejudice. They hypothesize that if the correlation between belief in genetic race differences and contemporary prejudice is statistically significant, it should be zero after adjusting for old-fashioned prejudice. This is something we will test.

To date, the link between belief in genetic race differences and contemporary prejudice has not been systematically explored. One reason for this neglect is that genetic thinking about racial categories is often conflated with old-fashioned prejudice, a mistake we do not make here. Another reason for this neglect is abandonment of old-fashioned prejudice as a concept worthy of study.

HYPOTHESES

What we expect is that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice represent distinct but correlated common factors and are differentially predicted by belief in genetic race differences. Results consistent with these expectations support contemporary prejudice's validity by showing dissimilarity between it and old-fashioned prejudice. We test the following three hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators would represent two distinct common factors.

Hypothesis 2: Belief in genetic race differences would be linked to old-fashioned prejudice but not contemporary prejudice.

Hypothesis 3: If belief in genetic race differences is significantly related to contemporary prejudice, controlling for old-fashioned prejudice would attenuate the link.

METHODS

Sample

Data were collected as part of a larger telephone survey study conducted in 2001 concerning beliefs about and understanding of genetic science (see Jayaratne et al. 2009 for a description of the larger study). Professional interviewers conducted interviews between January 10, 2001 and June 20, 2001. Respondents were paid an incentive of \$15 (or \$20 for refusal conversion) for completing surveys, which lasted 40 minutes on average. Telephone numbers were dialed using the random digit dialing (RDD) method, drawing from telephone exchanges representing the continental United States. Within a household, respondents were selected randomly based on race (black or white) and age (18 years or older). Individuals who self-identified as multi-racial were asked for a primary racial affiliation and only individuals who then identified as black or white were asked to participate in the study (see Jayaratne et al. 2009 for further description of sample selection procedures).

For this study, we analyzed data collected from the self-identified white respondents. The white sample ($n=600$) included approximately equal numbers of men and women, ranging from 19 to 90 years old. The response rate was 32 percent, a low response rate but one that is comparable with other published studies using the RDD method in the era of telemarketing, cellular phones, and caller identification. Compared with 2000 Census data, our white respondents were older, more educated, and more likely to have ever been married than whites in the U.S. population. To improve sample representativeness, we created post-stratification weights for age and education within respondent gender. No attempt was made to match interviewer race with respondent race but including a variable capturing respondent perception of interviewer race did not alter substantive conclusions (analyses available upon request). However, we omitted this variable because it had considerable missing data (65 out of 600), but note that of the 535 white respondents with valid data on this variable, 87.1 percent perceived their interviewer to be white.

Variables

The Appendix shows exact wordings for the prejudice and belief in genetic race differences indicators. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics (i.e., mean, standard deviation, range, skewness, and number of missing cases) for all variables used. Table 2 presents Pearson zero-order pairwise correlations among all variables used. Further, the following sections describe all variables in detail.

Racial Prejudice—We examined contemporary prejudice, disgust toward blacks, and being bothered by interracial dating/marriage. The arithmetic mean of eight items (Cronbach's $\alpha=.78$) captured the contemporary prejudice construct (see Henry and Sears 2002, Sears and Henry 2003 for a review of symbolic prejudice's psychometric properties). Contemporary prejudice gauges whites' sentiment that blacks do not try hard enough to overcome difficulties they face and that they take what they have not earned (Henry and Sears 2002; Kinder and Sanders 1996:106; McConahay and Hough 1976; McConahay 1986; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Sears 1988). Items such as "If Blacks don't do well in life, they have only themselves to blame" and "Blacks are too dependent on government help for getting ahead" measured contemporary prejudice. The metric response set was 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=neither agree/disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, and 5=strongly disagree.

Feeling disgust towards blacks was a single item and its metric response set was 1=often, 2=sometimes, 3=rarely, and 4=never (see Appendix). We and others propose is that disgust toward blacks is one of the most valid indicators of whites' old-fashioned prejudice because

it is affective and unambiguous (see Allport 1954; Krysan 2000; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Pettigrew and Meertens 1995; Sears and Henry 2003:260; Williams et al. 2000 who advocate similarly for affective measures of old-fashioned prejudice).

Interracial dating/marriage was measured by the arithmetic mean of two items. The first item asked respondents, “How bothered would you be if your son or daughter dated a black person?” and the second item asked respondents, “How bothered would you be if your son or daughter married a black person?” The metric response set ranged from 1=not at all bothered to 7=very bothered. Although we treat it as old-fashioned prejudice, opposition to interracial dating/marriage is characterized by some scholars (Dovidio and Gaertner 1996; Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993) as aversive prejudice because whites often construct color-blind reasons for opposition to such relationships (see such reasons in Bonilla-Silva 2003:116–118).

After recoding variables such that high values correspond with high racial prejudice (when necessary) and after arithmetic mean scaling (when necessary), responses on the three dependent variables were transformed to z scores to facilitate interpretation. As expected, measures of racial prejudice were significantly positively correlated (see Table 2). Being bothered by interracial dating/marriage was correlated with contemporary prejudice ($r=.35$, $p<.01$) and disgust toward blacks ($r=.28$, $p<.01$). And disgust towards blacks was associated with contemporary prejudice ($r=.15$, $p<.01$). These correlations support the similarity but not indeterminacy of contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice.

Belief in Genetic Race Differences—We examined perceived genetic differences, agreement that genes tell race, and agreement that people from the same race are genetically similar. These three measures are original and were created by the authors after focus group pre-testing and under the guidance of several geneticists. Perceived genetic differences captured black/white variation in athleticism, drive to succeed, mathematical aptitude, tendency toward violence, and intelligence (see Jayaratne et al. 2009 for detailed analyses of demographic correlates of each characteristic). For each characteristic, respondents first were asked if the black/white difference on the specified characteristic was due, at least in part, to genes. Respondents who declared that there was no difference were excluded, respondents who said “no” were coded as none, and respondents who answered “yes” then were asked if genes explained “very little”, “some”, “a lot”, or “just about all” of this difference. Answers to the two questions were combined, resulting in five variables that measured respondents’ estimates of the amount of racial difference in each characteristic due to genetic causes: 0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 3= a lot, and 4=just about all. We computed the arithmetic mean of the five variables (Cronbach’s $\alpha=.81$). We caution that belief in genetic difference does not necessarily imply black inferiority or white superiority.

The second and third indicators of belief in genetic race differences captured whites’ understanding of genetics (see Appendix). The second tapped whether respondents agreed with the statement that, “Our genes tell us which race we belong to.” The third assessed whether respondents agreed that, “Two people of the same race will always be more genetically similar to each other than two people from different races.” The metric response set for both was 1=strongly agree, 2=somewhat agree, 3=neither agree/disagree, 4=somewhat disagree, and 5=strongly disagree. These indicators’ framing was generic making no reference to blacks or whites or any racial/ethnic group. Both were reverse coded such that high values correspond with strong belief in genetic race differences.

Measures of belief in genetic race differences were significantly positively correlated (see Table 2). For instance, genes tell what race a person belongs to was linked with two people from the same race are more genetically similar than two people from different races ($r=.20$,

$p < .01$) and perceived genetic differences ($r = .17$, $p < .01$). Also, two people from the same race was associated with perceived genetic differences ($r = .18$, $p < .01$). These correlations suggest some incoherence in whites' understanding of genetics (see Lanie et al. 2004 for discussion of public misunderstanding of genetic science).

Control variables—We included age in years, a categorical measure of education ranging from 1 (“less than 12th grade”) to 7 (“professional or doctoral degree”), a categorical measure of family income ranging from 1 (“less than \$5,000”) to 11 (“\$100,000 or more”), gender (dummy coded such that women=1 and men=0), marital status (dummy coded to contrast formerly married, married, and never married respondents), a categorical measure of political conservatism ranging from 1 (“very liberal”) to 5 (“very conservative”), and region (dummy coded to contrast respondents living in the Northeast, South, West, and Midwest). Although not the focus of the current investigation, these control variables have been shown to be important correlates of whites' racial prejudice (Allport 1954; Bobo and Smith 1994; Bogardus 1933; Krysan 2000; Schuman et al. 1997; Sears et al. 1997; Williams et al. 2000).

Analytic Techniques

Hypotheses were tested using principal axis factor analysis with oblique rotation and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis. Principal axis factor analysis was used to investigate whether prejudice indicators shared common variance. Use of this technique assumes interval data (or ordinal data with relatively equal spaced categories), no correlations among unique factors or correlations among unique and common factors, and non-singularity in the data matrix (Kim and Mueller 1978). These assumptions were verified by empirical fit of the model (see Table 3). OLS regression analysis was used to investigate associations between belief in genetic race differences and prejudice adjusting for control variables. Use of this technique assumes independence and normality of residuals, homoscedasticity, and relationship linearity (Allison 1999). Diagnostics indicated that no models grossly violated these assumptions.

Missing data were deleted listwise except in summative scores, which were created for every respondent with a valid response to at least one item on the score. Summative scores were divided by the number of items over which the sums were calculated to produce an arithmetic mean score. Inferential tests were two-tailed and estimates with error probabilities less than .10, .05, and .01 were considered statistically significant. Sampling (probability multiplied by non-response) weights were applied in the OLS regression analyses generating robust standard errors. We used Stata 10.1 for all analyses.

RESULTS

Factor Analysis of Contemporary and Old-Fashioned Prejudice Indicators

Table 3 shows results from three principal axis factor analyses: contemporary prejudice indicators alone (left panel), old-fashioned prejudice indicators alone (middle panel), and contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators together (right panel). Factors were extracted according to the conventional eigenvalue greater than 1.00 criteria and the multiple factor extraction (right panel) was obliquely rotated. These analyses estimate the degree prejudice indicators share common variance. Two pieces of information for each indicator are shown: a loading (i.e., estimate of common variance) and uniqueness (i.e., estimate of non-common variance). The correlation between factors in the right panel, where two factors were actually retained, was equal to .41.

When contemporary prejudice indicators were analyzed alone, one factor was extracted and 31 percent of the common variance among these indicators was explained. All indicators of contemporary prejudice loaded on the factor greater than .30, a cutoff demonstrating acceptable fit. Similarly, when old-fashioned prejudice indicators were analyzed alone, one factor was extracted and 63 percent of the common variance was explained by it. However, most of the common variance explained was due to the two items concerned with intimate interracial relationships, each of which had loadings in excess of .94.

When contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators were analyzed together, two correlated factors were extracted. The first factor, on which the old-fashioned indicators grouped, explained 29 percent of the common variance, whereas the second factor, on which the contemporary indicators grouped, explained 13 percent of the common variance. In analysis including all prejudice indicators (right panel of Table 3), we note two things. First, there was a consequential (greater than .30) cross-loading for the indicator “blacks are too dependent on government help for getting ahead”. Despite the item’s factorial ambiguity, we decided to keep it in subsequent analyses because of its widespread use (see Sears and Henry 2003:264). Second, the loading for disgust towards blacks was much smaller than loadings for the other two old-fashioned prejudice indicators, suggesting that affective measures may indeed be distinct. In response, we use disgust towards blacks as a single item measure in subsequent analyses and being bothered by interracial dating/marriage as a separate measure.

In analysis not shown but available upon request, we factor analyzed old-fashioned prejudice measures with belief in genetic race differences measures (see Appendix). Loadings for perceived genetic differences, genes tell race, and two people from the same race are similar were all less than .30, whereas indicators of old-fashioned prejudice all had loadings in excess of .30. This suggests old-fashioned prejudice and belief in genetic race differences are unique concepts, contrary to some assertions.

Overall, Hypothesis 1 was supported. Analyses demonstrated that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators represent two correlated but distinct constructs. We found some variation among factor loadings but contemporary prejudice and being bothered by interracial dating/marriage indicators form tenable scales. Additional information about the factor structure such as the item-factor correlation and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy are available upon request. But briefly, all indicators in Table 3 exceeded the KMO threshold of 0.5, supporting their amenability to factor analysis. Moreover, all but two of the eleven indicators in Table 3 had KMO values greater than .70.

Predicting Racial Prejudice Using Belief in Genetic Race Differences

Table 4 summarizes four regressions of prejudice on belief in genetic differences. Unstandardized coefficients and their standard errors are shown. But again, the dependent variables are standardized so interpretation is consistent with that of a semi-standardized equation. The main reason we report a semi-standardized equation is to facilitate interpretation because the unstandardized dependent variables (i.e., contemporary prejudice and two measures of old-fashioned prejudice) have different metric response sets. In this case, interpretation of independent variables’ effects is consistent with the conventional interpretation of effect size, particularly when a one-unit change in the independent variable is roughly equivalent to a standard deviation (see Table 1).

Six Models (1, 2, 3a, 3b, 3c, and 3d) are presented in Table 4. The first and second use disgust towards blacks and being bothered by interracial dating/marriage, respectively, as dependent variables whereas the remaining four predict contemporary prejudice. We focus primarily on the three measures representing belief in genetic race differences and whether

these measures predict types of prejudice. In all models, we controlled for age, education, family income, gender, marital status, political conservatism, and region, all of which correlate with whites' racial prejudice and/or shape its manifestation.

We found that perceived genetic differences predicted increasing levels of old-fashioned prejudice (Models 1 and 2), net of the control variables. Also, whites' levels of disgust toward blacks, opposition to interracial dating/marriage, and contemporary prejudice were significantly and directly predicted by belief that two people from the same race are more genetically similar than two people from different races (Models 1, 2, and 3a). Agreement with the statement that genes tell which race a person belongs to was not significantly correlated with old-fashioned prejudice (Models 1 and 2). It was, however, marginally linked to contemporary prejudice in the following way: Agreement that genes tell race predicted lower levels of contemporary prejudice (Model 3a). We speculate about the meaning of this unexpected finding in the Discussion. Finally, explained variances were 6.3 percent, 23.6 percent, and 19.3 percent in disgust toward blacks, being bothered by interracial dating/marriage, and contemporary prejudice respectively.

Results in Table 4 are partly consistent with Hypothesis 2. For instance, as we hypothesized, perceived genetic differences had significant direct relationships with disgust and interracial dating/marriage but no association with contemporary prejudice. In contrast, agreement that two people from the same race are similar predicted high levels of old-fashioned prejudice and contemporary prejudice. The latter result involving contemporary prejudice contradicts recent theorizing about the shifting ideological basis of whites' racial attitudes. Also and surprisingly, the third indicator of belief in genetic race differences, genes tell race, had a negative association with contemporary prejudice.

A F test of whether coefficients for perceived genetic differences, agreement that genes tell race, and agreement that two people from the same race are similar were simultaneously zero was statistically significant for disgust towards blacks (F with 3, 513 df=6.81, p=.0002, Model 1), bothered by interracial dating/marriage (F with 3, 514 df=9.01, p=.0000, Model 2), and contemporary prejudice (F with 3, 515 df=3, 31, p=.0201, Model 3a). These omnibus test statistics suggest that both types of prejudice are predicted by genetic thinking about race.

Next we investigated whether the relationship between belief in genetic race differences and contemporary prejudice was due to the joint influence of old-fashioned prejudice. The argument is this: Because old-fashioned prejudice relates to belief in genetic race differences and contemporary prejudice, any relationship we observe between belief in genetic race differences and contemporary prejudice could be spurious. Therefore, we introduced disgust toward blacks, the more valid of our two measures of old-fashioned prejudice, into the model predicting contemporary prejudice (see Model 3b in Table 4). We found belief that two people from the same race are more genetically similar than two people from different races still predicted high levels of contemporary prejudice. Agreement that genes tell race still predicted low levels of contemporary prejudice. In keeping with the literature, disgust towards blacks was directly associated with contemporary prejudice. Explained variance in contemporary prejudice in Model 3b was 20 percent.

When we used being bothered by interracial dating/marriage rather than disgust towards blacks in Model 3c and used both being bothered by interracial dating/marriage and disgust towards blacks in Model 3d, belief that two people from the same race are more genetically similar was no longer statistically linked to contemporary prejudice. Yet in both Model 3c and 3d in Table 4, agreement that genes tell race was still negatively associated and being

bothered by interracial dating/marriage was positively linked to contemporary prejudice. Explained variance in contemporary prejudice in Models 3c and 3d was 26 percent.

A F test of whether coefficients for perceived genetic differences, agreement that genes tell race, and agreement that two people from the same race are similar were simultaneously zero was marginally significant (F with 3, 512 df=2.53, $p=.0562$, Model 3b) and non-significant (F with 3, 513 df=1.72, $p=.1628$, Model 3c and F with 3, 511 df=1.55, $p=.2019$, Model 3d). These omnibus tests affirm that belief in genetic race differences is related to contemporary prejudice mostly because of its association with old-fashioned prejudice. However, continued import of two people from the same race to predicting contemporary prejudice, even after controlling for disgust towards blacks and other variables like political conservatism, raises important questions about parallelism between types of prejudice and provides equivocal support for Hypothesis 3. Further, being bothered by interracial dating/marriage wiped out the effects of two people from the same race and disgust towards blacks (see Model 3c and Model 3d). Finally, the negative but consistent relationship between genes tell race and contemporary prejudice is certainly unexpected.

DISCUSSION

Consistent with prior research (Henry and Sears 2002:268; Hughes 1997:59; Meertens and Pettigrew 1997; Tarman and Sears 2005:754–5), contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice indicators loaded on two correlated common factors. In future studies, researchers should consider whether either type of prejudice is, or both types of prejudice are, multi-dimensional (see Meertens and Pettigrew 1997 and Sears and Henry 2003). Thus, we advocate for factor analyses of contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice using a variety of indicators of each construct. However, this task may be difficult because old-fashioned prejudice indicators are increasingly omitted from social surveys, a trend that we assert is problematic.

Findings were mostly consistent with the expectation that whites' old-fashioned prejudice but not contemporary prejudice is driven by biological attributions about difference and superiority (see Bonilla-Silva 2003; Kinder and Sanders 1996:115; Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000; Sears and Henry 2003; Tarman and Sears 2005:737). However, some findings were not consistent. For example, belief that genes tell which race a person belongs to was not significantly linked to old-fashioned prejudice, controlling for other variables. In addition, believing two people from the same race will always be more genetically similar was significantly associated with high levels of contemporary prejudice.

Further, agreeing that genes tell which race a person belongs to was marginally but consistently linked with low levels of contemporary prejudice. We speculate that this association represents white paternalism. What we mean by white paternalism is that if racial inequality is purportedly determined by black genetic difference and inferiority, some whites may feel that blacks are simply incapable of improving their lot in life and as a result, feel sympathy for them rather than antipathy toward them. We recommend that future research address directly whether white paternalism attenuates the negative association between genes tell race and contemporary prejudice.

Finally, in contradiction to arguments made by Kinder and Sanders (1996:97), we found that two people from the same race predicted contemporary prejudice after controlling for disgust towards blacks (see Table 4, Model 3b). This suggests that whites endorse primitive beliefs about race, even when expressing anti-black affect in a socially desirable manner. However, this association disappeared when being bothered by interracial dating/marriage was entered into the equation (see Table 4, Models 3c and 3d).

To sum up, while whites' negative attitudes toward blacks may have shifted at least when assessed in close-ended social survey questions, belief in genetic race differences still weakly and sometimes inversely correlates with contemporary prejudice. Hence the question remains whether whites' underlying understanding of racial categories and their reaction to them has changed at all. In the remainder of the Discussion, we describe study limitations and outline future directions for research based on findings reported here.

Limitations

First, we acknowledge a potential problem with causal order: it is possible that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice causally precede belief in genetic race differences. For example, a respondent's prior level of prejudice may determine whether they embrace genetic thinking about race. Causal order cannot be determined without longitudinal data. Second, two measures of belief in genetic race differences were captured by single items. A single item measure often has more measurement error. Further, measures capturing belief in genetic race differences were created by the authors and thus their psychometric properties are not well known. Third, the concept of traditional prejudice could have been better operationalized. For instance, being bothered by interracial dating and being bothered by interracial marriage were highly correlated and as previously stated, sometimes both are considered indicators of aversive (not traditional) prejudice (see Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn 1993:26). Fourth, measures of belief in genetic race differences may be subject to social desirability. Respondents might have filtered their responses to survey questions linking genetics and race.

Old-Fashioned Prejudice, Social Desirability, and Measuring Racial Progress

Some researchers argue that including old-fashioned prejudice indicators (e.g., "blacks are disgusting"; "blacks are lazy"; "blacks are violent") in present-day social surveys is nonsensical because of whites' social desirability concerns (Bonilla-Silva 2003; Krysan 2000; Sears et al. 1997; Sears 1998; Sears, Henry, and Kosterman 2000). We disagree and suggest that social surveys assessing whites' racial attitudes should routinely include such indicators because for one thing, they can be important predictors. For instance, Leach, Peng, and Volckens (2000) distinguished 'means' from 'structure', documenting that declines in race-related survey items' mean levels are not married to declines in those survey items' predictive power. In addition, we note that contemporary prejudice may soon become reactive to social desirability (Henry and Sears 2002:274; Tarman and Sears 2005:757). Taking this possibility seriously, we argue that beyond whites' racial attitudes, attention must be paid to black/white convergence in outcomes like access to housing, incarceration rates, gainful employment, life expectancy, proximity to hazardous waste plants, price paid for new cars, forcible police stops, access to medical procedures, etc. Tolerant racial attitudes among whites and black/white convergence in material outcomes are essential to manifest real racial progress.

Accordingly, there is danger in drawing conclusions about movement toward racial tolerance from changes in whites' racial attitudes alone. Not unrelated, we argue that cultural and situational explanations for white superiority (called "liberal environmentalism" by Kinder and Sanders 1996:95) are no less damaging than genetic explanations for white superiority. This is because such ideological justifications are fungible and therefore the system and process of racism remains stable despite shifts in the expression or intensity of whites' racial prejudice. This begs the question then: Why frame contemporary prejudice or color-blind ideology as something new when the same old beliefs about difference and inferiority support it?

Why Do Beliefs about Genetic Race Differences Correlate with Prejudice?

At least one indicator of belief in genetic race differences predicted contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice. This fact resonates with arguments presented by Weigel and Howes (1985) and McConahay and Hough (1976) who maintain that contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice are manifestations of the same underlying anti-black affect. Consequently, we speculate that anti-black affect is driven in part by thinking about race as a natural, immutable category. Similarly, Weigel and Howes (1985:124–5) state, “New social developments will probably bring new ways to express negative attitudes and the concomitant need for new item content.” But they go on to proclaim that, “...high intercorrelations that typically obtain among the scores on the various dimensions [of prejudice] imply that all these dimensions are manifestations of a more basic dispositional tendency to disparage blacks.” That proclamation evokes the colloquialism ‘old wine in new bottles’, which may characterize survey researchers’ quest to invent racial attitude items that whites are willing to endorse. If follows then, had survey researchers spent more time developing ‘new’ old-fashioned prejudice indicators they might have discovered that many whites do not repudiate old-fashioned prejudice.

Offering another perspective on types of prejudice, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993) conceptualize white prejudice on a continuum, beginning with aversive attitudes (most mild), moving to contemporary attitudes, and then ending with old-fashioned attitudes (most harsh). This conceptualization suggests that prejudice is a unitary cumulative dimension that begins with avoidance and ends with anti-black affect. That formulation is consistent with findings reported here because belief in genetic race differences had relationships with contemporary and old-fashioned prejudice. In further support of this, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993:26) classified disdain for interracial dating/marriage as aversive prejudice (but that classification is contested, see Dovidio and Gaertner 1996).

Our findings speak to the power of genetic explanations. Genetic explanations presuppose stability in and the futility of challenging the status quo, which in turn, might explain why belief in genetic race differences predicts whites’ prejudice. We suspect that genetic science will have increasing consequence in the public realm when genes are mapped onto phenomena like race or intelligence or are used to explain unwelcome outcomes (Condit 1999; Condit, Ofulue, and Sheedy 1998; Rothman 1998; Jayaratne et al. 2009). However, empirical evidence is inconclusive regarding genetic determinism in the public realm and people’s predilections to make genetic attributions (see Condit 1999; Condit, Ofulue, and Sheedy 1998; Jayaratne et al. 2009). For example, Condit and associates (1998) found little evidence of increasing genetic determinism from 1915–1995 in a content analysis of newspapers and magazines. But as information regarding genetic science is dispersed in rapid succession to the lay public through the media (see Lanie et al. 2004 for discussion of the media’s impact), genetic explanations could become utilitarian when consistent with people’s attitudes toward socially disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, Sears, Henry, and Kosterman (2000:77–8) concluded that contemporary prejudice is the strongest predictor of whites’ support for ameliorative policy, surpassing other correlates. Specifically, contemporary prejudice scores are negatively correlated with support for ameliorative policies. Hence, if belief in genetic race differences predicts high scores on contemporary prejudice then belief in genetic race differences indirectly predicts lower levels of support for ameliorative policy. In contrast then, when measures of belief in genetic race difference are negatively linked to contemporary prejudice, they indirectly predict higher levels of support for ameliorative policy. So based upon findings reported here, belief in genetic race differences indirectly explains whites’ support for ameliorative policy through its relationship with contemporary prejudice.

In conclusion, investigations of racial attitudes address more than an academic issue. At stake are contentious claims such as whether U.S. society is approaching racial parity, harmony, and integration; whether ameliorative policies are necessary; and whether government is obligated to engineer anti-racism. In the past, present, and probably well into the foreseeable future, these claims have pitted citizens against one another. Duration of such antagonisms proves persistence of the color line as our nation's longest standing social problem and mandates continued study of racial attitudes, among whites and blacks and others.

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Appendix. Measures of Racial Prejudice and Belief in Genetic Race Differences

CONTEMPORARY PREJUDICE

1. “Please tell me if you STRONGLY AGREE, SOMEWHAT AGREE, SOMEWHAT DISAGREE or STRONGLY DISAGREE with the following statements. (a) Society has reached the point where blacks and whites have equal opportunities for success. (b) Blacks are too dependent on government help for getting ahead. (c) Discrimination against blacks is a serious problem in the United States. (d) Whites have an unfair advantage in our society. (e) Many groups of Americans overcame discrimination and made it on their own. Blacks should do the same. (f) If blacks don't do well in life, they have only themselves to blame. (g) Preferential treatment for blacks is necessary to make up for discrimination. (h) In this society, whites have many more opportunities to get ahead than blacks.” (1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Neither agree nor disagree 4=Somewhat disagree; 5=Strongly disagree)

OLD-FASHIONED PREJUDICE

1. Disgust Towards Blacks. “Next, people have different feelings toward some groups in our society. I'm going to read you a list of groups and I'd like you to tell me how often you have certain feelings toward them. We're not asking your feelings about any specific person in the group, but how you feel about the group of people, in general. How often do you get disgusted with blacks?” (1=Often; 2=Sometimes; 3=Rarely; 4=Never)

2. Interracial Dating/Marriage. “Next, I'm going to ask you how bothered you would be in a few different situations. Even if you have not had these experiences, try to imagine how you might feel if the situation were to happen to you. We'll be using a scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means you would NOT BE BOTHERED AT ALL and 7 means you would be VERY BOTHERED, or you could give me any number in between. People we've talked with have given us many different answers to these questions. (a) How bothered would you be if your son or daughter dated a black person? (b) How bothered would you be if your son or daughter married a black person?”

BELIEF IN GENETIC RACE DIFFERENCES

1. Perceived Genetic Differences. “First, some people think whites tend to differ from blacks in how good they are in ATHLETICS. Although there are many reasons why they might differ, do you think their genes or genetic make up has anything to do with this difference?” (1=Yes; 2=No) “In your opinion, how much of this difference between whites and blacks is due to their genes? Would you say very little, some, a lot or just about all?” (0=None; 1=Very little; 2=Some; 3=A lot; 4=Just about all)

“Some people think whites tend to differ from blacks in their DRIVE TO SUCCEED. Do you think their genes have anything to do with this difference?” (1=Yes; 2=No) “How much of this difference between whites and blacks do you think is due to their genes?” (0=None; 1=Very little; 2=Some; 3=A lot; 4=Just about all)

“Some people think whites tend to differ from blacks in how good they are in MATH. Do you think their genes have anything to do with this difference?” (1=Yes; 2=No) “How much of this difference do you think is due to their genes?” (0=None; 1=Very little; 2=Some; 3=A lot; 4=Just about all)

“Some people think whites differ from blacks in their TENDENCY TO ACT VIOLENTLY. Do you think their genes have anything to do with this difference?” (1=Yes; 2=No) “How much of this difference do you think is due to their genes?” (0=None; 1=Very little; 2=Some; 3=A lot; 4=Just about all)

“Some people think whites tend to differ from blacks in INTELLIGENCE. Do you think their genes have anything to do with this difference?” (1=Yes; 2=No) “How much of this difference do you think is due to their genes?” (0=None; 1=Very little; 2=Some; 3=A lot; 4=Just about all)

2. Genes Tell Race. “Our genes tell us which race we belong to.” (1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Neither agree nor disagree; 4=Somewhat disagree; 5=Strongly disagree)

3. People from Same Race Similar. “Two people from the same race will always be more genetically similar to each other than two people from different races.” (1=Strongly agree; 2=Somewhat agree; 3=Neither agree nor disagree; 4=Somewhat disagree; 5=Strongly disagree)

Table 1

Univariate Statistics Describing Contemporary Racial Prejudice and Old-Fashioned Racial Prejudice, Belief in Genetic Race Differences, and Control Variables (n=600)

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range	Skewness	Missing
1. Contemporary Prejudice	0	1	-2.3-2.3	-.09	0
Contemporary Prejudice ^a	3.02	.86	1-5	-.09	0
2. Disgust toward Blacks	0	1	-1.8-2.0	-.17	2
Disgust toward Blacks ^a	2.43	.80	1-4	-.17	2
3. Interracial Dating/Marriage	0	1	-1.3-1.4	.09	2
Interracial Dating/Marriage ^a	3.90	2.21	1-7	.09	2
4. Perceived Genetic Differences	.91	.84	0-4	.81	5
5. Genes Tell Race	3.98	1.35	1-5	-1.19	13
6. People from Same Race Similar	3.21	1.43	1-5	-.27	11
7. Age	49.57	17.16	19-90	.31	3
8. Education	3.48	1.61	1-7	.26	9
9. Family Income	6.29	2.79	1-11	.25	34
10. Gender (1=women; 0=men)	.50	.50	0-1	.01	0
11. Formerly Married (1=yes; 0=else)	.24	.42	0-1	1.25	0
12. Married (1=yes; 0=else)	.63	.48	0-1	-.55	0
13. Never Married (1=yes; 0=else)	.13	.34	0-1	2.16	0
14. Political Conservatism	3.15	1.13	1-5	-.17	6
15. Northeast (1=yes; 0=else)	.16	.37	0-1	1.84	0
16. South (1=yes; 0=else)	.31	.46	0-1	.80	0
17. West (1=yes; 0=else)	.18	.39	0-1	1.65	0
18. Midwest (1=yes; 0=else)	.34	.48	0-1	.66	0

^aUnstandardized versions of contemporary and old-fashioned racial prejudice.

Table 2

Pearson Pairwise Zero-Order Correlations among Contemporary Racial Prejudice and Old-Fashioned Racial Prejudice, Belief in Genetic Race Differences, and Control Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	
1. Contemporary Prejudice	1.0																		
2. Disgust toward Blacks	.15	1.0																	
3. Interracial Dating/Marriage	.35	.28	1.0																
4. Perceived Genetic Differences	.08	.18	.24	1.0															
5. Genes Tell Race	.01	.03	.10	.17	1.0														
6. People from Same Race Similar	.16	.12	.26	.18	.20	1.0													
7. Age	.02	.04	.31	.17	.03	.07	1.0												
8. Education	-.30	.04	-.11	-.05	-.09	-.14	-.01	1.0											
9. Family Income	-.08	.04	.00	.06	-.01	-.04	-.13	.41	1.0										
10. Gender (1=women; 0=men)	-.01	-.03	.05	-.02	-.11	-.04	.10	-.09	-.15	1.0									
11. Formerly Married (1=yes; 0=else)	-.07	.03	.10	.06	.03	.02	.36	-.06	-.33	.16	1.0								
12. Married (1=yes; 0=else)	.10	-.01	.08	-.05	-.02	.03	-.06	.08	.40	-.05	-.73	1.0							
13. Never Married (1=yes; 0=else)	-.06	-.01	-.24	-.01	.01	-.06	-.36	-.05	-.16	-.14	-.22	-.51	1.0						
14. Political Conservatism	.30	.08	.21	.11	.07	.02	-.11	-.06	-.01	.02	-.02	.11	-.14	1.0					
15. Northeast (1=yes; 0=else)	-.09	-.05	-.01	.06	.06	.04	.02	-.01	-.01	.04	.10	-.07	-.03	-.04	1.0				
16. South (1=yes; 0=else)	.18	.05	.14	-.03	-.03	.01	.05	.04	.01	-.09	-.09	.11	-.03	.05	-.30	1.0			
17. West (1=yes; 0=else)	-.10	-.00	-.16	-.06	-.05	-.08	.02	.08	-.05	.02	.13	-.17	.08	-.11	-.21	-.32	1.0		
18. Midwest (1=yes; 0=else)	-.02	-.01	-.00	.03	-.06	.03	-.08	-.10	.03	.04	-.09	.09	-.02	.08	-.32	-.49	-.34	1.0	

Note: Pairwise sample sizes range from 554 to 600. Coefficients with absolute values approximately greater than .08 were statistically significant at $p < .10$. Coefficients with absolute values approximately greater than .09 were statistically significant at $p < .05$. Coefficients with absolute approximately values greater than .10 were statistically significant at $p < .01$.

Table 3
 Path Loadings from Factor Analytic Models Explaining Common Variance among Contemporary Racial Prejudice and Old-Fashioned Racial Prejudice Indicators

<i>Indicators</i>	Contemporary Prejudice		Old-Fashioned Prejudice		Contemporary and Old-fashioned Prejudice	
	F1	Uniqueness	F1	Uniqueness	F1	F2
1. Equal opportunities for success	.63	.61			-.06	.66
2. Blacks are too dependent on government	.38	.86			.40	.18
3. Discrimination against blacks	.57	.68			-.06	.60
4. Whites have an unfair advantage	.64	.59			-.03	.67
5. Many groups of Americans overcame	.55	.70			.23	.43
6. Only themselves to blame	.60	.64			.11	.54
7. Preferential treatment for blacks	.40	.84			.01	.40
8. Whites have many more opportunities	.65	.57			-.14	.72
9. Disgust toward blacks			.29	.91	.33	-.01
10. Son or daughter dated a black person			.95	.10	.96	-.06
11. Son or daughter married a black person			.95	.09	.96	-.08
		n=586		n=594		n=581

Table 4
Summaries of OLS Regression Models: Predicting Racial Prejudice Using Belief in Genetic Race Differences and Control Variables

Variables	1					
	Disgust Towards Blacks	Interracial Dating/Marriage	3a	3b	3c	3d
Age	.00 (.00)	.01** (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.00 (.00)	-.01 ⁺ (.00)	-.00 ⁺ (.00)
Education	.05 (.03)	-.06* (.03)	-.17** (.03)	-.18** (.03)	-.15** (.03)	-.16** (.03)
Family Income	.01 (.02)	.04 ⁺ (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)	-.03 (.02)	-.03 (.02)
Gender (1=women)	-.00 (.09)	.03 (.09)	-.06 (.08)	-.06 (.08)	-.07 (.08)	-.07 (.08)
Married (1=yes)	.02 (.12)	-.20 (.12)	.17 (.11)	.17 (.11)	.23* (.10)	.23* (.11)
Never Married (1=yes)	.05 (.18)	-.41** (.16)	.03 (.16)	.02 (.16)	.15 (.15)	.14 (.15)
Political Conservatism	.04 (.04)	.13** (.04)	.20** (.04)	.20** (.04)	.17** (.04)	.16** (.04)
South (1=yes)	.30 ⁺ (.16)	.32* (.13)	.43** (.13)	.40** (.13)	.34** (.12)	.35** (.12)
West (1=yes)	.23 (.17)	-.12 (.14)	.06 (.15)	.04 (.14)	.10 (.14)	.09 (.14)
Midwest (1=yes)	.17 (.15)	.04 (.12)	-.02 (.12)	-.03 (.12)	-.03 (.11)	-.03 (.11)
Perceived Genetic Differences	.21** (.05)	.17** (.05)	.03 (.05)	.01 (.05)	-.02 (.05)	-.02 (.05)
Genes Tell Race	-.01 (.04)	-.00 (.03)	-.05 ⁺ (.03)	-.05 ⁺ (.03)	-.05 ⁺ (.03)	-.05 ⁺ (.03)
People from Same Race Similar	.07* (.03)	.10** (.03)	.07* (.03)	.06* (.03)	.04 (.03)	.04 (.03)
Disgust Towards Blacks				.10* (.04)		.03 (.04)
Bothered by Interracial Dating/Marriage					.29** (.05)	.28** (.05)
Constant	-1.01	-1.43	-.13	-.03	.28	.31
n	527	528	529	527	528	527
R-squared	.063	.237	.193	.200	.259	.259

⁺
p < .10

*
p < .05

**
p < .01

Note: Unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. Excluded dummy variables are “formerly married” and “Northeast”.